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FLAWED INSTITUTIONS AND
MARKETS: FROM THE SAVINGS
& LOAN DEBACLE FORWARD

Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory
Lending and the Subprime
Mortgage Loan Securitization
Pyramid Scheme
Navid Vazire*
0DQ\ UHFHQW DFFRXQWV RI WKH PRUWJDJH PDUNHW·V RQJRLQJ
meltdown, which is at the heart of the broader economic crisis,
have identified numerous flaws in the manner in which
mortgage loans were sold and securitized in recent years. A
number of authors have paid particular attention to excessive
risk-taking by Wall Street firms and investors, and have
expressed much concern about preventing such behavior and
its grave consequences in other financial markets. These
authors have identified a number of causes contributing to the
current crisis including: (1) the unprecedented complexity of
financial instruments and transactions,1 (2) the conflicts of
interest facing credit ratings agencies,2 (3) the over-
* Staff Attorney, Foreclosure Prevention Project, South Brooklyn Legal
SerYLFHV ´6%/6µ  1RYHPEHU  ² June 2009;; J.D., 2006, New York
University School of Law;; M.S., 2003, University of Texas, Austin;; B.S., 2000,
Columbia University. My thanks go to the staff of the Foreclosure Prevention
Project at SBLS, and to the many consumer advocates throughout the
country, who taught me the difficult work of representing borrowers caught
in the complex legal and financial systems discussed in this Article.
1. See generally, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193 (2008);; Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction³Structured Finance
and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009).
2. See generally, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM·N, REPORT ON
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collateralization of real estate based on an unrealistic
expectation of perpetually increasing values,3 (4) the
inadequacy of disclosures made to securities investors,4 (5)
regulatory failures,5 and (6) the incaution of securities issuers
and investors who poured money into a complex system that
they did not fully understand.6 Most of these commentators
have identified mortgDJH ORDQ VHFXULWL]DWLRQ·V HYLVFHUDWLRQ RI
PRUWJDJHRULJLQDWRUV·LQFHQWLYHVWRPDNHVRXQGORDQVDVDNH\
factor in causing the crisis. However, these authors have not
explored the manner in which originators responded to those
changed incentives. Rather, these criticisms³spurred by the
massive and unforeseen depreciation of mortgage-backed
VHFXULWLHV ´0%6µ 7³are addressed to the modern financial
system as a whole, rather than specifically to the subprime
mortgage crisis, and are almost entirely focused on limiting
investor losses and systemic collapse. Other authors have
described the growth of predatory mortgage lending and the
AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF
(2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf;; Christopher M.
Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes
in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT·L L. 125 (2008);; David
Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
985 (2006).
3. See generally, e.g., Unterman, supra note 1;; Yuliya S. Demyanyk &
Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 5,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research
Network),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396
(follow
´'RZQORDGµ -RKQ.LII 3DXO0LOOVMoney for Nothing and Checks for Free:
Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets ,QW·O 0RQHWDU\
Fund,
Working
Paper
No.
WP/07/188,
2007),
available
at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf.
4. See generally, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An
Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation,
2007 WIS. L. REV. 977 (2007).
5. See generally, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The
Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 271 (2008);; Vincent Di Lorenzo, Federalism, Consumer Protection and
Regulatory Preemption: A Case for Heightened Judicial Review, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 273 (2008);; Gerding, supra note 4;; Schwarcz, supra note 1;;
Unterman, supra note 1;; Paul M. Schwartz, Note, Where Do We Go From
Here? The Battle Against Predatory Subprime Lending, 3 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 213 (2008).
6. See generally, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3.
7. See infra note 51.
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culpability of securities issuers and investors in permitting this
practice to occur.8 However, few scholars have closely explored
the causal connection, beyond simply asserting it, between the
occurrence of predatory mortgage lending on the one hand and
the rise of subprime mortgage loan securitization and the
eventual collapse of the MBS market on the other.
In fact, the fraudulent and abusive mortgage lending
tactics that have been documented were facilitated and even
provoked by the securitization of mortgage loans. First,
securitization removed two important risks customarily
associated with mortgages, namely (1) the risk of WKH OHQGHU·V
bankruptcy, and (2) the risk of debt-unenforceability because of
some illegality in the origination of the loan.9 The decoupling
of these risks from securitized mortgage loans rendered the
securitizers10 and investors indifferent to the business practices
of originators, no matter how flagrant, abusive, and ultimately
XQVXVWDLQDEOH WKH\ ZHUH  6HFRQG RULJLQDWRUV· FRPSHQVDWLRQ
depended on both the volume of loans they originated and on
the unfavorability of the terms of those loans.11 Originators
collected up-front fees from borrowers, thereby encouraging
WKHP WR GULYH XS FRVWV  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH\ FROOHFWHG ´RXWVLGH RI
FORVLQJµ IHHV IURP VHFXULWL]HUV WKDW ZHUH EDVHG RQ ORDQ WHUPV
including interest rates, prepayment and other penalties, and
loan amounts.12 As a result, aggressive originators sought to
8. See generally, e.g., Brescia, supra note 5;; Julia Patterson Forrester,
Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and
Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303 (2006);; Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007);;
Schwartz, supra note 5. These authors tend to limit the blame they assign to
securitizers and investors to facilitation rather than active promotion of
predatory lending practices, and thus do not analyze the manner in which
WKHVHSDUWLHVEHQHILWHGIURPRULJLQDWRUV·DEXVLYHSUDFWLFHV
9. See discussion infra Part I.
10. , ZLOO XVH WKH WHUP ´VHFXULWL]HUVµ to refer to the various entities
involved in purchasing mortgage loans from originators and selling securities
backed by those loans to investors. Securitizers include the following: (1) the
financial institutions who purchase and pool the loans and issue securities,
(2) the companies who rate the securities, (3) the companies who are enrolled
to collect monthly payments from borrowers and transmit them to the
appropriate parties, (4) the entities who review loan files for compliance with
underwriting guidelines, and (5) the entities who maintain the numerous
documents relating to the loans, mortgages, and agreements between the
various parties.
11. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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close many loans with large principal amounts and with terms
that were expensive for the borrowers (and thus lucrative for
securitizers and investors). Because originators sold these
loans within months or sometimes even days, they were not
FRQFHUQHG ZLWK HQVXULQJ D ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ WKH
debt.13 Third, securitizers and investors³who did bear the risk
of borrower defaults and thus could reasonably have been
expected to perform adequate due diligence to ensure the long-
term viability of loans they purchased³devised convoluted and
unprecedented loan terms that, at least in the medium run,
turned defaults from sources of loss to sources of massive
profits.14 Indeed, mortgage loan unaffordability was central to
WKHUDWHRIWKHPRUWJDJHPDUNHW·VJURZWKLQUHFHQW\HDUV, as it
directly led to millions of refinances by borrowers who were
unable to keep up with their rising mortgage payments,15
ZKLFKLQWXUQXOWLPDWHO\OHGWRWKHPDUNHW·VFUDVK
The mortgage industry did not always suffer from these
infirmities. Traditionally, mortgage loan originators, typically
savings and loan associations, held the vast majority of loans
they made in their portfolios until those loans were fully paid,
often years after origination.16 This meant that lenders were
committing substantial amounts of capital, for long periods of
time, to each loan they made. When a borrower defaulted on
her loan, the originating lender bore the cost of collection and
any resulting loss. Consequently, lenders carefully scrutinized
HYHU\ ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ D SURSRVHG ORDQ UHTXLUHG
substantial equity (a down payment in the case of a purchase
money loan³the most common kind of mortgage loan at the
time), and lent on terms that could reasonably be expected to
be affordable to the borrower in the long run.17 Because the

13. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
14. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2).
15. Data provided through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
´+0'$µ) § 302, 12 U.S.C. 2801 (2006), demonstrates that in 2004, a
majoriW\ RI QHZ FRQYHQWLRQDO PRUWJDJH ORDQV LQFOXGLQJ QHZ ´KLJKHU-SULFHGµ
loans, were refinanced loans rather than purchase money loans. See
generally, e.g., Lei Ding et al., Neighborhood Patterns of High-Cost Lending:
The Case of Atlanta, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193
(2008).
16. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 2191-94 (discussing the origins of the
American mortgage industry).
17. Id.
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transaction was relatively simple, a borrower could easily
compare various offers and make an educated decision about
which available loan was the most favorable. While the system
was not perfect, lenders had a limited ability and desire to
induce borrowers to take on more than they could afford.
However, because lenders were investing their own capital, the
number of loans they were able to make was constrained.18
The limited availability of funds to lend to property owners
made the costs of borrowing prohibitive for many would-be
homeowners. Because each lender made relatively few loans
and was particularly vulnerable to defaults, they were
comparatively inefficient.
The recent widespread use of
securitization has enabled individual lenders to close many
more loans and streamline their procedures.19 Because many
of these new mortgage lenders were not banks, they were not
subject to capital reserve requirements and other regulations,
which further impeded efficiency.20 In addition, there has been
18. The Federal Government did ease this constraint to some extent by
creating several entities, most notably the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), see 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006), and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), see 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (2006), to
SXUFKDVH DQG VHFXULWL]H PRUWJDJH ORDQV LQ RUGHU WR IUHH XS OHQGHUV· FDSLWDO
DQG DOORZ WKHP WR PDNH PRUH ORDQV  7KHVH FRPSDQLHV· DELOLW\ WR EX\
mortgages, however, paled in comparison to that of the investors worldwide
who would later enter the market. More importantly, as explained below, the
government-created entities carefully devised lending criteria for lenders
whom they financed, requiring them to vet borrowers in a manner similar to
that which they had traditionally used. See discussion infra Part I(A).
19. See *LRYDQQL 'HOO·$ULFFLD 'HQL],JDQ  /XF /DHYHQ Credit Booms
and Lending Standards: Evidence From the Subprime Mortgage Market 31
(European Banking Ctr., Working Paper No. 2009-14S, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100138
(follow
´'RZQORDGµ  QRWLQJWKDWWKHYROXPHRIPRUWJDJHORDQRULJLQDWLRns covered by
HMDA grew from $1.184 trillion in 2000 to $3.031 trillion in 2005);; Kiff &
Mills, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that total mortgage originations were slightly
greater than $500 billion in 1995, and reached more than $3.5 trillion in
2003);; Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit
Expansion: Evidence From the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis 9 (Dec. 12, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research Network),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304 (IROORZ ´'RZQORDGµ  ILQGLQJ
WKDW´>W@KHDQQXDOL]HGJURZWKUDWHRIRULJLQDWLRQVIRUKRPHSXUFKDVH>ZLWKLQ
the studied zip codes] jumps from 14.4% from 1996 to 2002 to 19.4% from
 WR µ DQG QRWLQJ WKDW ´WKH DJJUHJDWH 86 PRUWJDJH PDUNHW LV
approximaWHO\WULOOLRQµ 
20. The National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 100 (1864) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), today, provides for numerous
regulations of bank activities by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
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greater diversity among MBS investors than there was among
savings and loans investors regarding their tolerance for risk.21
Some investors were therefore willing to invest in riskier loans
than banks had traditionally been willing to make and own.
This opened up the availability of credit, to a large segment of
the population, which had been considered intolerable credit
risks and thus had been systematically shut out by traditional
These are the often professed virtues of
banks.22
securitization³more loans, at lower costs, extended to a wider
range of people. The perception of these benefits and the
enormous profitability of securitizing subprime mortgage loans
blinded many people, in particular lawmakers and regulators,
WR WKH PDUNHW·V IODZV LQFOXGLQJ LWV FUHDWLRQ RI KDUPIXO
incentives to place millions of homeowners into unaffordable
mortgage loans by almost any means.
I. The Evolution of the Mortgage Lending Market
Over the last century³particularly the last twenty years³
the mortgage lending industry has changed in ways that
significantly modified the roles and responsibilities of the
participating businesses. Over time, mortgage lending has
become more common as the result of the introduction of two
participants: the Federal Government and private investors.
As these market participants increased their involvement and
influence, the role and responsibilities of the front-line makers
of loans (i.e., the originators) were vastly reduced, utterly
transforming their incentives and behavior. Law and policy
have failed to keep pace with these drastic changes, and have
(for national bank associations) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (for
savings associations). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 59 (2006) (prescribing the method
by which a national bank may reduce its capital);; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (2006)
GLUHFWLQJ WKH 2IILFH RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ WR LPSRVH ´FDSLWDO VWDQGDUGVµ RQ
savings associations).
21. See Unterman, supra note 1, at 57, 61 (explaining that securitization
HQDEOHG LQYHVWRUV WR ´VSHFLILFDOO\ WDLORU WKHLU GHVLUHG ULVN H[SRVXUHVµ DQG
GHVFULELQJWKHLQFUHPHQWDOL]DWLRQRIULVNWKURXJKWKHXVHRI´WUDQFKHVµ 
22. Racism was an important component of the refusal to lend to the
supposedly non-credit-worthy. See generally, e.g., Shelby D. Green, Disquiet
RQWKH+RPH)URQW'LVWXUELQJ&ULVHVLQWKH1DWLRQ·V0DUNHWVDQG,QGXVWULHV,
30 PACE L. REV. 7, 13 n.25 (2009). This phenomenon³known as redlining³is
beyond the scope of this Article. See also infra note 93 and accompanying
text.
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left borrowers, investors, and financial markets vulnerable to
gross distortions in traditional apportionment of risk.23
A. 7KH 7UDGLWLRQDO ´7ZR 3DUW\µ DQG ´7KUHH 3DUW\µ 0RGHOV RI
Mortgage Lending24
Originating in the nineteenth century, the evolution of
mortgage lending in the United States has been both
complicated and haphazard. A number of scholars have clearly
and comprehensively described the particulars.25 For the
purposes of this Article, the most salient characteristic of pre-
New Deal mortgage lending was the source of lending capital.
Lenders at that time did not have access to outside sources of
financing and did not sell the loans they made;; thus they lent
entirely from their own capital.26 The number of loans that a
lender could make was therefore limited by the funds actually
held by that lender. In addition, because lenders continuously
owned the mortgage loans they made, they bore the full risk of
borrower default. That risk compelled lenders to carefully
DVVHVVHDFKERUURZHU·VDELOLW\WRUHSD\WKHORDQDQGWRGHFOLQH
to lend to anyone who posed even a minimal risk of default.27
The careful assessment of risk was coupled with requirements
that few people could satisfy, including significant equity ratios
(normally forty percent) and short terms to maturity (usually
one to five years).28 In addition, lenders were typically
staunchly discriminatory and refused to lend to both racial
minorities and women.29 2QO\ D VPDOO PLQRULW\ RI WRGD\·V
mortgage borrowers³affluent, white men³would have

23. For a more thorough description of the various lending schemes
discussed in this section, see Peterson, supra note 8, at 2191-2213.
24. , KDYH DGRSWHG WKH WHUPV ´WZR SDUW\µ DQG ´WKUHH SDUW\µ WR GHVFULEH
these lending models. See id. at 2191-97 (utilizing the terms).
25. For a comprehensive account of the complexity of this evolution, see
id. at 2191-94.
26. In most cases, that capital consisted mainly of deposits by members
of the institutions, who were originally the only ones entitled to borrow those
funds. Insurance companies and individual property sellers also commonly
made mortgage loans.
27. See id. at 2191-92.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2192-93.
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qualified for a loan under such circumstances.30 The pre-New
Deal mortgage industry was characterized by simple funding
mechanisms, severely limited lending capital, and generally
ardent lender caution.31
The many Federal Government initiatives meant to
stimulate stagnating industries during the Great Depression
included efforts to shore up real estate sales and residential
construction.32 Over the course of the Great Depression, more
than half of all residential mortgage borrowers defaulted on
their loans.33 This prompted a massive foreclosure stampede
and subsequent devaluation of real estate, and consequently
put an emphatic end to further mortgage lending.34 In order to
recapitalize and reassure hard hit lenders, the Roosevelt
administration purchased many of their non-performing
loans.35 This practice removed liabilities carrying significant
uncertainty froP WKH OHQGHUV· ERRNV DQG VKRUHG XS WKHLU
depleted capital reserves.36 The government quickly followed
these purchases with the creation of the Federal Housing
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´)+$µ 37 which insured privately-made
mortgage loans that met FHA-established conditions and thus
protected lenders from the risk of borrower defaults on such
loans.38 The FHA-imposed conditions promoted caution by
establishing affordability measures.39 The FHA also promoted
30. Id.
31. As Professor Peterson points out, however, mortgage lenders began
financing their operations through bonds secured by the mortgage loans they
made in the 1880s. Id. at 2193-94. This early experiment with securitized
funding of the mortgage lending market collapsed in the 1890s. Id.
32. Id. at 2194-97.
33. Id. at 2194.
34. Id. at 2194-97.
35. Id. at 2195-96.
36. This practice also enabled the Federal Government to refinance the
troubled mortgages, thus allowing many borrowers to remain solvent and
resume their economic participation. One could argue that purchasing the
´WURXEOH DVVHWVµ DV WKH\ PLJKW EH FDOOHG WRGD\ PD\ KDYH OHG WR D PRUDO
hazard and improvident lending practices. As described in the following
paragraphs, however, the other policies instituted on the heels of these
purchases, constrained lender behavior in a manner that reduced such
incentives.
37. The National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).
38. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 2195-96.
39. Id.
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the extension of credit to a far broader array of borrowers by
reducing, but not eliminating, the equity ratio requirements
that had been traditionally imposed, and by extending loan
maturities to a period up to thirty years, thereby spreading
repayment over a much longer period of time and reducing the
monthly repayment burden placed on borrowers.40 The most
revolutionary development was the creation of the Federal
National 0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ )10$ RU ´)DQQLH 0DHµ 
which was charged with purchasing qualifying mortgage loans
from lenders, thus freeing them to make more new loans.41
Instead of having their capital tied up in mortgage loans for
thirty years, lenders could quickly sell qualifying loans to
Fannie Mae (and later to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation³´)UHGGLH 0DFµ 42 and reuse that same capital to
make more loans.43 Lenders could thus make far more
mortgage loans than their capital would otherwise have
allowed without bearing the risk of borrower default on those
loans.
An important constraint on mortgage originators was that
mortgage loans had WR PHHW WKH *6(V· FULWHULD LQ RUGHU WR EH
sold. By strictly enforcing their underwriting and other
FULWHULD WKH *6(V ZHUH DEOH WR NHHS PRUWJDJH RULJLQDWRUV·
incentives nearly constant.
The considerations that had
factored into the decision to lend beforH WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V
involvement, although generally somewhat relaxed by the
*6(V· UHTXLUHPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ ERUURZHU LQFRPH DQG RWKHU
ILQDQFLDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV LQFOXGHG WKH SURSHUW\·V HTXLW\
UHVHUYHV DQG WKH ORDQ·V WHUPV  7KLV UHOD[DWLRQ ZDV FUXFLDO WR
maintaining the same originator practices, which had
previously been driven entirely by their own large stake in
each mortgage they made. The fundamental change in the
originator business model would have had the potential to
drastically affect their behavior absent some countervailing
pressure from the GSEs upon whom originators depended for
40. Id. at 2196.
41. Id. at 2197-99. See also supra note 18.
42. See supra note 18.
43. Peterson, supra note 8, at 2196. The Federal Housing Association
´)+$µ  )DQQLH 0DH WKH *RYHUQPHQW 1DWLRQDO 0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ
´*LQQLH 0DHµ ZKLFK ZDV )DQQLH 0DH·V VSLQ-off), and Freddie Mac will
hereinafter be referred to as the Government Sponsored Enterprises
´*6(Vµ 
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revenue.
B. The Private Securitization Model
When private entities, mainly traditional banks and
investment banks, began purchasing mortgage loans and
issuing associated securities whose values were derived from
MBS,44 WKH\ HVVHQWLDOO\ UHSOLFDWHG DQG DPSOLILHG WKH *6(V·
roles, but used different criteria for mortgage origination. Over
time, as the private label MBS market matured and stabilized,
underwriting criteria were relaxed further in order to meet
LQYHVWRUV· JURZLQJ GHPDQG IRU 0%645 By the height of the
subprime mortgage boom, in the period 2004-2006, it was
common for securities to be based, at least in part, on mortgage
loans with varying interest rates, varying payments (that were
sometimes not based on interest rates), and non-amortizing
PRQWKO\ SD\PHQWV ZLWKRXW DQ\ GRFXPHQWDWLRQ RI ERUURZHUV·
LQFRPHV RU DVVHWV VRPHWLPHV GHVSLWH WKH ERUURZHUV· KDYLQJ
supplied extensive documentation to their loan officer who, for
whatever reason, deemed it undesirable).46 The subprime
loans made during this era differed from traditional mortgage
loans in ways that made them far less viable over their thirty-
year terms. In addition, loan amounts were increasing at a
rapid pace and home equity was vanishing despite rising
property values.47 Thus, a great number of large loans were
secured by newly created property values and owed by
homeowners who were not nearly affluent enough to repay
them.
Securitizers and investors had ample information about

44. MBS are special cases of asset-EDFNHG VHFXULWLHV ´$%6µ  Zhich can
be backed by any number of assets, including other consumer debts, such as
credit card receivables, automobile loans, and consumer merchandise loans.
45. See Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at  VWDWLQJ WKDW ´>X@QWLO  WKH
PDMRULW\ RI PRUWJDJH RULJLQDWLRQV ZHUH ¶SULPH FRQIRUPLQJ· ORDQVµ WKDW FRXOG
EHSXUFKDVHGE\*6(VEXWWKDW´E\RYHUKDOIRIDOORULJLQDWLRQVGLGQRW
PHHW WKH *6(V· ¶FRQIRUPLQJ· FULWHULD,µ LQGLFDWLQJ D SURJUHVVLYH Geterioration
of standards from 2003 until 2006).
46. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2).
47. See, e.g., Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 3, at 28-29 (arguing,
in part, that rising loan-to-YDOXHUDWLRV ´/79Vµ FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHVXESULPH
PRUWJDJH PDUNHW·V EXVW PHDQLQJ WKDW HTXLW\ PXVW KDYH EHHQ YDQLVKLQJ DV
loan amounts were increasing). See also infra note 70 (discussing LTVs).
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the changes in lending standards and the glaring
incompatibility of subprime mortgage loan terms with their
ERUURZHUV·LQFRPHV48 But the securities backed by these loans
were rated extremely safe and were far more profitable than
comparable securities,49 so no efforts were made to curb the
increasingly risky lending schemes. In fact, the MBS market
experienced massive expansion just as the soundness of
subprime mortgage loans went from dubious to implausible.50
By the time the market reached its peak³in terms of hundreds
of billions of dollars of outstanding securities³its securities
were based on mortgage loans so fantastically detached from
WKHLUERUURZHUV·ILQDQFLDOPHDQVWKDWE\HDUO\WZR-thirds
of those securities were in default, and of those, the senior-most
third of these securities lost approximately 68% of their value,
while the rest lost roughly 95% of their value.51
II. Consensus Diagnosis: Failure by All Parties to
Appropriately Assess Risk of Real Estate Downturn
A number of scholars have studied the evolution of
subprime mortgage loan securitization, forming limited
consensus about some of its consequences but diverging about
others. The consensus³to the extent it exists³is that investor
demand for MBS increased sharply during the last several
\HDUV RI WKH PDUNHW·V ERRP OHDGLQJ WR WKH VLJQLILFDQW
deterioration of lending standards, which in turn resulted in a
greater-than-tolerable percentage of unsustainable mortgage
loans.52 There is also near consensus that this overreach
48. Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 3, at 32.
49. See, e.g., Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating
Agencies Failed America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 1275, 1289-90 (2009) (describing the unusually high rate of default for
modern collateralized debt obligations of a certain rating, as compared with
corporate bonds receiving the same rating in the ten previous years).
50. See Kiff & Mills, supra QRWH  DW  H[SODLQLQJ WKDW ´SULYDWH ODEHOµ
securitization increased sharply between 2002 and 2006).
51. See Gillian Tett, Time is Nigh to Put the True Value of CDOs Out in
the Open, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 2009, at 22.
52. See, e.g. 'HOO·$ULFFLD ,JDQ  /DHYHQ supra note 19, at 3 (finding
ZLGHVSUHDG ´GHFOLQH LQ OHQGLQJ VWDQGDUGVµ DQG D FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH
extent of the deterioration and prevalence of subprime mortgage loans and
securitization of loans);; Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 6-7 (noting the shift
IURP´SULPHFRQIRUPLQJµORDQVSXUFKDVHGE\WKH*6(VZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHGWKH
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RFFXUUHG SULPDULO\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR ´VXESULPHµ PRUWJDJH
loans.53 One implication of these conclusions is that subprime
mortgage loan securitization directly contributed to the
PDUNHW·V HYHQWXDO FROODSVH  +RZHYHU WKHUH LV ZLGHVSUHDG
disagreement regarding the causes that led to the wholesale
GLVUHJDUGRIVXESULPH0%6·VLQILUPLWLHV
As indicated above, various authors have suggested the
following³mostly compatible³explanations for the current
crisis: (1) the failure of credit rating agencies to honestly
disclose the credit risks associated with the securities they
rated,54 (2) the unrealistic optimism of mortgage borrowers
regarding their financial means,55 (3) the inadequacy of
traditional individual credit score ratings for the purpose of
mortgage lending,56 (4) the complexity of the financial
instruments which led to unintentional risk-taking by
investors,57 (5) the failure of financial regulators to limit the
rapid rate of financial innovation,58 and (6) the sheer incaution
of investors.59
While several authors acknowledge that
predatory lending practices may have led to the making of bad
loans, none examine the extent to which this happened, the
´PDMRULW\µ RI PRUWJDJH ORDQV SULRU WR  WR VHFXULWL]HG VXESULPH ORDQV
ZKLFKGLGQRWPHHWWKH*6(V·FULWHULDDVZHOODV´VWURQJLQYHVWRUDSSHWLWHIRU
higher-yielding securities in 2005-06 [which] probably contributed to looser
XQGHUZULWLQJVWDQGDUGVµ 
53. See 'HOO·$ULFFLD,JDQ /DHYHQ supra note 19, at 2-3;; Kiff & Mills,
supra note 3, at 6-7.
54. See generally, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM·N, supra note
2;; Bruner, supra note 2;; Reiss, supra note 2.
55. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra QRWHDW QRWLQJWKDW´ERUURZHUVZHUH
ILQDQFLDOO\ RYHUVWUHWFKLQJ YLD ULVN\ ¶DIIRUGDELOLW\ SURGXFWV·µ DQG FRQFOXGLQJ
ZLWKRXW H[SODQDWLRQ WKDW ´PDQ\ >ERUURZHUV@ DSSDUHQWO\ O>LHG@ DERXW WKHLU
ILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRJHWORDQVµ 
56. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax
Screening? Evidence From Subprime Loans (Dec. 25, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research Network), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137)
(follow
´'RZQORDGµ  H[SODLQLQJ WKDW OHQGHUV WHQGHG WR SHUIRUP OHVV VFUHHQLQJ RI
borrowers with higher credit scores, resulting in more reckless lending to
higher-rated borrowers, and thus undermining the correlation between high
borrower credit score and ability to repay the particular loan).
57. See generally, e.g., Gerding, supra note 4;; Schwarcz, supra note 1;;
Unterman, supra note 1.
58. See generally, e.g., Brescia, supra note 5;; Di Lorenzo, supra note 5;;
Gerding, supra note 4;; Schwarcz, supra note 1;; Unterman, supra note 1;;
Schwartz, supra note 5.
59. See generally, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3.
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ways in which it may have been facilitated, or the potential it
had to distort the MBS market.60
One especially noteworthy account holds that the
securitization of mortgage loans protected investors from the
ULVN RI RULJLQDWRUV· EDQNUXSWF\ DQG LQ WKH SURFHVV, distorted
the incentives of market participants in a manner that
encouraged excessive risk-taking.61 In particular, this account
finds that investors who did not bear the risk of mortgage
RULJLQDWRUV· LQVROYHQF\ KDG OLWWOH UHDVRQ WR VFUXWLQL]H WKH
business
practices
of
originators
to
ensure
their
sustainability.62 Had the mortgage loans backing the MBS
remained within the reach of the bankruptcy estates of
PRUWJDJH RULJLQDWRUV WKHQ LQYHVWRUV ZKRVH VHFXULWLHV· YDOXHV
were based on those mortgage loans would have had
considerable incentives to invest in mortgages unlikely to be
caught up in bankruptcy proceedings.63 But because that
possibility was drastically reduced by the securitization
mechanisms devised by modern securities issuers, this
SDUWLFXODU ´EDQNUXSWF\ WD[µ ZDV HOLPLQDWHG64 As a result,
60. A number of scholars, most notably Christopher Peterson, have
shown connections between securitization and predatory lending. See
generally Peterson, supra note 8. These efforts, however, have largely been
confined to the behavior of mortgage originators and have not closely
examined the incentives of other market participants that may have fueled
the destructive origination practices or the effect that these practices could
have on the market at large. See generally Brescia, supra note 5;; Di Lorenzo,
supra note 5;; Forrester, supra note 8;; Peterson, supra note 8;; Allison De Tal,
Comment, Knowledge is Power: Consumer Education and the Subprime
Mortgage Market, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 633 (2008);; Schwartz, supra note 5.
61. See generally, e.g., Unterman, supra note 1 (explaining that the
bankruptcy remoteness of mortgage lenders led their creditors to disregard
the risky nature of their conduct).
62. Id. at 79-80 (noting that financial institutions that financed
subprime lenders were aware of, and disregarded, WKHOHQGHUV·ULVN\OHQGLQJ
practices).
63. ,QGHHGWKHIDLOXUHRIPRUWJDJHRULJLQDWRUVFRQWULEXWHGWRWKH·V
crash of the mortgage-backed bond market. See Peterson, supra note 8, at
2193-94.
64. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1564-
   GLVFXVVLQJ WKH ´EDQNUXSWF\ WD[µ   $ VHSDUDWH DQG IDU OHVV
significant bankruptcy tax was created instead. Namely, investors still bore
WKH ULVN WKDW WKH 6SHFLDO 3XUSRVH 9HKLFOHV ´639Vµ  FUHDWHG WR RZQ WKH
mortgage loans, see Unterman, supra note 1, at 59, would themselves become
bankrupt. But because those SPVs did literally nothing other than own
loans, they were far less likely to become bankrupt for any reason other than
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subprime mortgage originators were free to engage in many
types of highly risky behaviors without suffering any losses in
business from investors, via the securitizers, who ultimately
funded their businesses.65 The identification of such a shift in
incentives, which went unmatched by a corresponding shift in
regulation or policy, alerts us to an opportunity to correct the
regulatory and policy failure.
The works of the various authors who have addressed the
mortgage market bust are, to varying degrees, persuasive
explanations RI VRPH RI WKH FDXVHV RI WKH PDUNHW·V PHOWGRZQ
Some of these causes were probably fatal on their own. This
paper is consistent with the various explanations that have
been offered, but seeks to add another that has received
insufficient consideration³that is, another single-handedly
fatal cause of the crisis had to do with the manner in which the
lending industry interacted with the borrowers whose
PRUWJDJHSD\PHQWVXOWLPDWHO\XQGHUSLQQHGWKH0%6·VYDOXHV
The fraudulent and abusive tactics that were often employed to
enroll homeowners into mortgage loans were intimately
connected to the features of subprime loans that made them
both highly profitable for securitizers and investors in the
short-run and unsustainable in the long-run.
III. Changes in the Mortgage Lending Industry Caused a
Seismic Shift in Incentives that Law and Policy Failed to
Acknowledge
The progression from two party and three party mortgage
transactions that dominated the twentieth century, to the
many-party transactions that were emblematic of subprime
mortgage lending during the 1990s and 2000s, fundamentally
transformed the behavior of market participants. In order to
focus on the most consequential of these changes, securities
WKH ORDQV· RZQ IDLOXUHV WR SHUIRUP LQ ZKLFK FDVH WKH LQvestors would suffer
losses anyhow. See id. at 59-60.
65. The one kind of risk that this did not excuse originators from taking
had to do with making risky loans. The disposal of that kind of risk is the
subject of this paper. The risks disposed of by the elimination of the
bankruptcy tax included the risks posed by (1) under-capitalization, (2) illegal
activity subjecting the company to liability, (3) poor business judgment and
management, and (  EXVLQHVV GRZQWXUQV DQG RWKHU ´QDWXUDOµ ORVVHV RI
revenue.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/14

14

2009]

SMOKE AND MIRRORS

55

issuers and sellers, trusts and trustees, depositors, document
custodians, and servicers will often be treated collectively as
´VHFXULWL]HUVµ DOWKRXJK LW ZLOO VRPHWLPHV EH QHFHVVDU\ WR
distinguish between these various parties. Similarly, mortgage
originators and brokers will often be treated collectively as
´RULJLQDWRUVµ  %RUURZHUV DQG 0%6 LQYHVWRUV· EHKDYLRUV ZLOO
also be examined.66
A. Mortgage Originators
One aspect of mortgage lending that has not changed much
RYHU WKH \HDUV LV ZKDW PD\ EH FDOOHG WKH ´IURQW-HQGµ QDPHO\,
the originators who are the ERUURZHUV·RQO\FRQWDFWVZLWKLQWKH
vast mortgage lending industry.67 As discussed above,68 when
an originator makes a loan that it will hold in its portfolio, the
WUDQVDFWLRQ LV HLWKHU D ´WZR SDUW\µ RU D ´WKUHH SDUW\µ
transaction.69 In a two party transaction, the originator will
lend its own capital and will EHDUWKHIXOOULVNRIWKHERUURZHU·V
possible default. Defaults can be very expensive for a mortgage
loan holder because curing the default can involve numerous
collection efforts and other communications with the borrower,
extensive analysis of her new financial situation, reappraisal of
WKH SURSHUW\·V YDOXH DQG DQ DQDO\VLV RI WKH PRUWJDJHH·V RZQ
financial condition in order to determine which course of action
is warranted. Possible resolutions include renegotiation of the
66. &RQIXVLQJO\ RULJLQDWRUV DQG VHUYLFHUV RIWHQ XVH WKH WHUP ´LQYHVWRUµ
to refer to some or all of the members of the group of entities that I have
ODEHOHG ´VHFXULWL]HUVµ HVSHFLDOO\ WUXVWHHV  5HFDOO WKDW LW LV WKH WUXVWHH RQ
behalf of the trust, that has legal ownership of the mortgage loans and
therefore, absent collateral agreements assigning its rights elsewhere, has
control over thH KDQGOLQJ RI WKH WUXVW·V ORDQV LQFOXGLQJ WKHLU HQIRUFHPHQWs,
sales, and modifications.
67. Sometimes, especially recently, a borrower would interact principally
(or even solely) with a mortgage broker, who in theory was charged with
helping the borrower find a loan particularly suited to his or her situation.
Brokers often also act on behalf of lenders. They can be compensated by both
the borrower and the lender for bringing the parties together. Borrowers
often do not understand the dual nature of the mortgage broker and assume
WKDW WKH EURNHU·V OR\DOWLHV OLH RQO\ ZLWK WKHP  +RZHYHU IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI
this discussion, I will assume that borrowers interact directly with
originators (as is often the case) because originators and brokers have very
similar incentives and usually treat borrowers similarly.
68. See discussion supra Part I.
69. See discussion supra Part I.
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ORDQ·VWHUPVIRUEHDULQJIURPFROOHFWLQJRQWKHORDQIRUDSHULRG
of time in order to allow the borrower to recover from her
troubles, or foreclosing on the loan and seizing the property,
which may not recover the entire amount owed and may lead to
litigation even in non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions. All of
these courses of actions are costly. The originator who holds a
loan in portfolio, therefore, has a strong incentive to ensure³at
the time of the ORDQ·VLQFHSWLRQ³that the borrower will be able
to fully repay the loan and that there is sufficient equity or
collateral in the property to protect it if the borrower does
default and the property is liquidated in foreclosure or in an
open market sale.70
There are two main precautions taken by a two party
PRUWJDJHOHQGHUWRHQVXUHDERUURZHU·VDELOLW\WRUHSD\)LUVW
VXFKDOHQGHULVOLNHO\WRVHHNWRPDNHWKHERUURZHU·VPRQWKO\
mortgage payments predictable and consistent. If the amount
of future payments is capable of changing, especially in a
manner unknown at the time of origination, it is difficult to
ensure that the loan will always be affordable. A lender could
structure a loan so that payments will be constant for a long
enough period of time so that when the payment amount does
change, there will be ample equity in the property to cover the
remaining debt.71 However, even such a loan poses a risk
because collecting on a defaulted loan may be costly even if the
full amount of the debt is fully secured by a comparatively high
property value. As a result, the vast majority of loans that
were made prior to the private label securitization era had
fixed interest rates and were fully amortizing (meaning that no
debt would remain after the final monthly payment was
made).72 This maximized the predictability of future payment
amounts.73 Second, the monthly mortgage payments must not
70. The measure of equity compared to the mortgage amount is called
the loan-to-YDOXH UDWLR ´/79µ   /79 OLPLWV ZHUH FRPPRQO\ VL[W\ SHUFHQW
before the 1930s, and eighty percent for GSE-insured or purchased loans. See
infra note 77 and accompanying text.
71. A simple version of such a loan is one that has a balloon payment at
maturity³i.e., a loan that is not fully amortizing.
72. See discussion supra Part I(A).
73. The possibility of changing payment amounts was not fully
eliminated by fixed-interest, fully-amortizing loans because reinstating a
defaulted loan by, IRU H[DPSOH UHQHJRWLDWLQJ WKH ORDQ·V WHUPV RU E\
UHFDSLWDOL]LQJ WKH DUUHDUV FRXOG FDXVH WKH ORDQ·V SULQFLSDO LQWHUHVW UDWH RU
maturity date to change and thus affect the payment amounts.
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VWUDLQ WKH ERUURZHU·V EXGJHWVRVHYHUHO\DVWR SRVH DULVNWKDW
she will default on the loan. The lender therefore examines the
ERUURZHU·V GHEW-to-LQFRPH UDWLR ´',5µ  DQG HQGHDYRUV WR NHHS
that ratio below a certain percentage, which may vary
GHSHQGLQJRQWKHOHQGHU·VWROHUDQFHRIULVN%HFDXVHWZRSDUW\
lenders tend to be risk-averse, in light of the costs of borrower
defaults, the DIR is likely to be low enough to prevent default
in the case of short-term, unexpected losses of income or
increases in expenses. The acceptable DIR may vary from
lender to lender and even from borrower to borrower.
These lender precautions are not meant to benefit
borrowers. Rather, they are meant to protect mortgagees³
who, in two party mortgage transactions, are also the
originators of the mortgages³from the potentially high costs of
default by borrowers.74 Payment stability and affordability,
while usually desirable for borrowers, are crucial for risk-
averse lenders engaging in two party mortgage transactions.
But they do leave some room for lenders to take advantage of
unsophisticated borrowers who might have obtained better
terms if they had been more aware of both their own financial
PHDQV DQG WKH OHQGHUV· FULWHULD  7KXV D OHQGHU ZKR
determines that a particular DIR is appropriate for a particular
ORDQPD\ZHOOPDNHWKHERUURZHU·VPRQWKO\SD\PHQWVDVKLJK
as possible without exceeding that DIR, even though lower
payments would still have been profitable. However, it is
usually extremely undesirable for a lender in such a
transaction to place the borrower in a situation that risks
leading to default. Therefore, while the loan may not be
optimal, it will usually not be catastrophically expensive either.

74. Since these measures, implemented by mortgage loan originators,
are meant to protect those originators from default on loans the originators
hold in portfolio, one expects such measures to be absent where the
originators do not intend to hold the mortgage loans. Indeed, this is the case.
See Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Sub-
Prime Mortgage Crisis 29 (Sept. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with
the
Social
Science
Research
Network),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1167786
(follow
´'RZQORDGµ  FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKH ´RULJLQDWH-to-GLVWULEXWH PRGHOµ ZKHUHLQ D
OHQGHU LQWHQGV WR VHOO RU ´GLVWULEXWHµ  WKH ORDQs it originates, lowers the
quality of the loans originated by those lenders, and that the reduction in
TXDOLW\LVFDXVHGE\WKH´ODFNRIVFUHHQLQJLQFHQWLYHFUHDWHGE\WKHVHSDUDWLRQ
RIRULJLQDWLRQIURPWKHXOWLPDWHEHDUHURIWKHGHIDXOWULVNµ 
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1. Federal Government Maintained Originator Incentives
in Place
7KH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH PRUWJDJH
market had the potential to drastically change mortgage
RULJLQDWRUV· LQFHQWLYHV DQG EHKDYLRUV  $IWHU DOO LI WKH
government was going to insure an originator against losses or
buy its loans outright, it did not really matter anymore
whether borrowers defaulted on their mortgage loans.
However, the GSEs instituted strict underwriting guidelines
that limited the kinds of mortgages eligible for insurance or
purchase, thereby constraining originators who wished to
benefit from these programs.75 The government essentially
VRXJKW WR SUHVHUYH RULJLQDWRUV· LQFHQWLYHV WR HQVXUH ERUURZHU
affordability and guard against loss through the imposition of
',5 /79 DQG RWKHU UHTXLUHPHQWV  7KH JRYHUQPHQW·V
initiatives were meant to promote homeownership among those
who had traditionally not had access to mortgage loans because
WKH\ FRXOG QRW PHHW OHQGHUV· VWULFW UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG they
therefore relaxed some of the more stringent criteria.76 For
example, the LTV limit was raised to eighty percent, from what
had typically been sixty percent, in order to allow purchasers to
make smaller down payments.77 Mortgage terms were also
extended from five years or less to periods of up to thirty years,
thus reducing the amount of monthly mortgage payments
needed to pay off the loans by their maturity dates and
enabling more borrowers to meet the DIR requirements.78
These policies were intended to expand the middle class.79
Thus, in order to exclude affluent borrowers who could obtain
credit without government assistance, the GSE programs also
capped the principal amount and thereby excluded expensive
homes.
The GSEs also dealt exclusively with certain
government-supervised originators, excluding many of the
more aggressive and unstable originators that would appear
RYHUWKHFRXUVHRIWKHPDUNHW·VERRP
75.
at 3-7.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Peterson, supra note 8, at 2172. See also Kiff & Mills, supra note 3,
Peterson, supra note 8, at 2195-98.
See id. at 2195-96;; supra note 70.
Peterson, supra note 8, at 2196.
See id.
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The market for MBS, including those backed by mortgage
loans ineligible for GSE insurance or purchase, emerged when
investment banks began purchasing, pooling and securitizing
loans, much like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been doing
with certain conventional loans.80
Lenders justified the
imposition of less favorable terms, namely higher interest rates
and closing costs, by pointing to the greater risk of default
posed by unconventional loans,81 which in turn rendered the
associated securities potentially more profitable. Many of
WKHVH ERUURZHUV ZHUH FDOOHG ´VXESULPHµ D UHIHUHQFH WR WKH
credit risk they supposedly posed.82 As the market expanded
throughout the 1990s and this past decade, many new
originators appeared and existing originators shifted their
emphasis to meet and stoke the growing demand.
Subprime mortgage loan originators increasingly made
loans with the intention of selling them quickly into the
secondary market, and thus needed comparatively little capital
WRVXSSRUWODUJHQXPEHUVRIORDQRULJLQDWLRQV2ULJLQDWRUV·GH-
emphasis of portfolio lending led to a corresponding and
predictable de-emphasis of careful underwriting. Because they
would no longer bear the long-term (or sometimes even short-
term) risk of borrower default, originators became unconcerned
ZLWK HQVXULQJ WKHLU ORDQV· YLDELOLW\  ,QVWHDG RULJLQDWRUV· QHZ
concern was ensuring that there would be a secondary market
purchaser for each loan. This gave the investment banks that
pooled and securitized the mortgage loans great leverage over
originators, enabling them to dictate the loan characteristics
that they wanted originators to market to borrowers. It also
allowed investment banks, like the GSEs before them, to
demand assurances that the loans were sound. This was
usually done by imposing certain underwriting criteria and by
requiring originators to repurchase loans that defaulted within
80. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 6-10.
81. After all, the government (and government-created) entities refused
to insure or purchase these loans precisely because they did not meet their
criteria for soundness. In addition to this implication of risk, the lack of
government-backing for the loans itself shifted the risk of borrower default
onto mortgagees and investors.
82. See Brescia, supra note 5, at 287 (quoting Mortgage Market Turmoil:
Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Roger T. Cole,
Director, Federal Reserve, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation)).
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a certain, usually very short, period of time.83 Ultimately, the
banks were poised to dictate both the precise loan terms that
originators should offer to borrowers with certain profiles and
WKH VWHSV WKDW RULJLQDWRUV VKRXOG WDNH WR YHULI\ ERUURZHUV·
financial means. Many originators sought only to meet the
EDQNV· FULWHULa, which diminished considerably over time, and
made no additional efforts to evaluate the viability of the
mortgage loans they made. Thus, a crucial and longstanding
check on reckless lending was eviscerated.
Even more damaging than the loss of originatoUV·
LQFHQWLYHV WR ULJRURXVO\ VFUXWLQL]H WKHLU FXVWRPHUV· ILQDQFLDO
PHDQVZDVWKHSUHVVXUHWRRULJLQDWHRU´FKXUQµ84 loans at as
high a rate as possible. Because originators no longer held
many of the loans that they made for more than a few months,
they no longer derived much revenue from interest payments
on those loans. Instead, originators became almost entirely
dependent upon the upfront fees they charged borrowers and
any compensation they received from the secondary market
purchasers of loans. Originators therefore profited most from
closing as many loans as possible and doing so efficiently, i.e.,
as quickly as possible, which made them all too happy to oblige
WKH VHFRQGDU\ PDUNHW·V YRUDFLRXV GHPDQG IRU HYHU JUHDWHU
numbers of loans. Rather than spend the time and resources to
carefully vet each borrower, many originators sought to simply
induce borrowers to accept offers as quickly and effortlessly as
possible. It was not long before fraudulent practices became
rampant in the mortgage origination industry.85 It no longer
mattered whether a borrower could afford to repay the loan
RIIHUHG RU ZKHWKHUWKH ERUURZHU·VSURSHUW\ZDVZRUWK HQRXJK
to support the amount of the debt. Unscrupulous originators
thus began misrepresenting the cost of repayment to
borrowers, eliciting fraudulent appraisals to justify ever larger
mortgages, and sometimes even masking immediate defaults
by borrowers by falsifying loan files they sold on the secondary

83. Common underwriting criteria included LTR ratio, debt-to-income
ratio, credit score, and other information rHODWLQJWRWKHERUURZHU·VDELOLW\WR
repay the loan.
84. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV.
503, 546 (2002).
85. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/14

20

2009]

SMOKE AND MIRRORS

61

market.86
2.

Loss of Government Influence and the Emergence of
Deceptive Origination Practices

By offering complicated and unusual loan products with
shifting interest rates, shifting payment amounts, and less
than
fully-amortizing payments,
ambitious
mortgage
originators were able to convince unsophisticated borrowers to
accept excessively costly and ultimately harmful mortgage
loans. These unusual and complex loans were euphemistically
FDOOHG ´DIIRUGDELOLW\ SURGXFWVµ E\ WKH PRUWJDJH LQGXVWU\
because they created, for a short time, an appearance of
affordability by putting off the true cost of the loans until later
in the term.87 $GMXVWDEOH 5DWH 0RUWJDJHV ´$50Vµ  EHFDPH
increasingly common in the subprime mortgage industry as the
market for subprime MBSs expanded. One reason is that
many ARMs had ´WHDVHU ratesµ RU LQLWLDO LQWHUHVW UDWHV WKDW
were low and fixed for a short period of time (commonly
somewhere between six months and five years), and which then
changed at regular intervals over the remainder of the loan
term according to a formula based on a common interest rate
index plus a fixed margin. Teaser rates were much lower than
the projected fully-indexed rates, meaning that ARMs with this
feature were expected to experience significant increases in
required monthly payments after the teaser period, even if
prevailing interest rates did not change. These loans are often
referred to DV´µ´µ´µDQGVRRQ, according to the
number of years during which the teaser rate lasts and the
number of years during which the interest rate will be based on
the formula. An inexperienced borrower could easily be led by
a determined broker or loan officer to believe that the
SD\PHQWV GXH GXULQJ WKH ´IL[HGµ WHDVHU SHULRG ZRXOG DFWXDOO\
be the same payment amounts that would always be due
throughout the course of the loan.
In addition to deceptively manipulating interest rates,
86. See, e.g., Two Former Principals of Olympia Mortgage Indicted on
Conspiracy, Wire Fraud, and Bank Fraud Charges, REUTERS, May 8, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS246343+08-May-
2008+PRN20080508.
87. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 7.
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lenders also began creatively manipulating the amortization of
their loans. This process began with the introduction of
interest-only and balloon mortgage loans.
The monthly
payments made by borrowers with these kinds of loans were
QRW VXIILFLHQW WR IXOO\ UHSD\ WKH GHEW E\ WKH ORDQ·V PDWXULW\
date, and therefore a balloon payment would be due at that
date.88 Some loans had interest-only periods that did not last
the entire term of the loan;; these loans often had five- or ten-
year interest-only periods, after which they became fully
amortizing. The combination of opaque and deceptive interest
rate manipulations with unusual amortization schedules made
it exceedingly difficult for borrowers to determine what their
payments would be and just what principal those payments
would actually go towards paying off. This consequently
IDFLOLWDWHG RULJLQDWRUV· PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV WR ERUURZHUV DERXW
the cost of their loans, thus enabling the originators to induce
borrowers to accept loans that seemed far more affordable than
they truly were.
The true cost of many subprime mortgage loans did not
usually affect borrowers until one or two years after
origination. A borrower nearing or just reaching payment
shock was likely to be contacted by a number of mortgage
brokers and lenders, often including the one who had provided
WKH ORDQ RIIHULQJ WR ORZHU WKH ERUURZHU·V SD\PHQWV E\
refinancing the loan. By offering yet another convoluted loan
product, tKH QHZ ORDQ ZRXOG OLNHO\ ORZHU WKDW ERUURZHU·V
monthly payments for a short while, taking the borrower
through the very same ordeal all over again. At this point,
another feature of many subprime loans³the prepayment
penalty³takes effect.
Many subprime loans require a
borrower who pre-pays his or her loan within a certain amount
of time of origination³usually six months to three years³to
pay a penalty. A borrower who refinanced out of a subprime
loan with a prepayment penalty at the end of the teaser period
was likely to be charged a penalty for doing so. Thus, by
88. An interest-only loan is a special type of balloon loan in which the
monthly payments are in the exact amount of the interest generated each
month. At the time of maturity, the principal balance is thus exactly the
same as it was at origination (i.e., these loans are non-amortizing). Other
balloon mortgages typically have principal balances at maturity that are
slightly less than the original amount (i.e., these loans are amortizing, but
not fully amortizing).
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flipping borrowers from loan to loan, originators and brokers
were able to charge significant fees and penalties several times
to each borrower. This, of course, had the effect of depleting
laUJH DPRXQWV RI ERUURZHUV· HTXLW\ ZLWKRXW SURYLGLQJ WKHP
much, if any, benefit. Eventually, mixtures of the kinds of
exotic terms discussed in this section were devised to ensure
the continuation of the cycle of default and refinance with
calculated precision and predictability, thus enabling lenders to
decide when they would force a particular borrower to take her
next loan.
By the time a subprime mortgage borrower experienced
payment shock, the loan had often long been sold and
securitized and the originator was only involved as the
servicer, if at all. The originator could therefore credibly claim
to no longer have the authority to help the borrower. Even
worse, numerous subprime originators were mere fly-by-night
shells³requiring very little capital to operate their
businesses³who had shut down by the time many of their
borrowers ran into trouble. This left those borrowers to try to
explain their predicament to a servicer operating as the front
for a group of entities with a convoluted set of interests in that
loan, all of whom claimed to have had nothing to do with the
RULJLQDWRU·V SUDFWLFHV DQG were unable to rectify the resulting
problems. Borrowers who found themselves in this situation
were made to feel like the only options available to them were
to either sell their homes or try their luck with one of the many
new loans being peddled to them.
Lenders mastered the practice of obfuscation and deception
ZKHQ WKH\ GHYHORSHG WKH 3D\PHQW 2SWLRQ $50 ´32$50µ 89
A POARM typically has an extremely low teaser rate lasting no
more than a few months, during which time the borrower
makes fully amortizing payments. As a consequence of the
near-zero teaser rate, the payment amount is quite small.
That payment amount is then locked in before the interest rate
89. Many POARMs were marketed as Alt-A loans, rather than subprime
loans, and were thus intended to be safer investments. While it is true that
POARM interest rates were generally capped slightly lower than those of
other subprime loans, their terms were so confusing and risky, especially
because they were aggressively marketed to seniors and other borrowers with
limited and fixed incomes who were incapable of withstanding the certain
payment shock, that they presented at least as high a risk of default as any
subprime loan product.
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changes, often to four or five times the initial rate, after its
brief teaser period. As a result, the monthly payments do not
suffice to even pay the interest that accrues each month, thus
producing negative amortization. However, an inexperienced
borrower who assumes that her monthly payments bear some
relation to her interest rate will not realize that this has
happened, and will therefore assume that she has an affordable
loan. This situation cannot, of course, last for thirty years.
Therefore, the amount that the principal can reach is capped
by the terms of the loan to some percentage of the original
amount, usually either 110% or 125%. When the negatively
amortizing principal reaches that cap, the borrower is required
to make fully amortizing payments, which can be in an amount
several times that of the prior monthly payments, all but
ensuring default.90 POARMs typically have long and severe
pre-payment penalties, which increase over time because they
are based on the outstanding principal balance. They are often
projected to remain in effect when the loan becomes fully
amortizing, thus adding significantly to the cost of paying off
the loan. This product truly perfected the practice of trapping
a mortgagor into an inscrutable loan and then bleeding her of a
tremendous amount of her home·s equity.
Because the fees generated by a loan are largely based on
the amount borrowed,91 originators have an incentive to lend
the largest amount possible. To that end, originators pressured
borrowers to consolidate all of their debts, including unsecured
debts, into their mortgages. For the same reason, originators
also encouraged borrowers to take some cash³perhaps to
make much needed home repairs, pay off utility and other bills,
or to just take that much deserved vacation.92 Similarly,
90. The payment shock is exacerbated by the increased principal and, at
this point, the now slightly reduced time left until maturity.
91. 7KLV LV ODUJHO\ GXH WR FHUWDLQ FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ ODZV·
discouragement of fees in excess of a certain percentage of the loan amount.
See, e.g., Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 ´+2(3$µ ,
Pub. L. 103-325 § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at and amending scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (imposing various additional disclosure requirements in
connection with loans whose interest rates exceed certain baselines).
92. Including a cash component has two additional benefits: (1) it allows
a lender to tarnish the credibility of the borrower who later sues it by
SRLQWLQJWRWKHERUURZHU·VJUHHG\GHSOHWLRQRIKLVRUKHURZQKRPHHTXLW\DQG
WR WKXV SURYLGH DQ DOWHUQDWH H[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKH ERUURZHU·V ´FKRLFHµ RI WKH
SDUWLFXODU ORDQ DQG   LW HQVXUHV WKH ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR PDNH PRUWgage
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originators were compensated by the secondary market
purchasers for imposing an interest rate greater than that for
which the borrower had qualified. The result was that
originators had incentives to originate mortgage loans that
were large and which had high interest rates for borrowers who
were considered to have questionable abilities to repay.
An obvious limitation of the expansion of the subprime
market was the shortage of people who could be characterized
as reasonably capable of repaying expensive and large
subprime mortgage loans and who did not already have access
to prime lending. This was primarily dealt with in two ways.
First, traditional lenders had largely refused to lend in
minority communities, leaving a considerable portion of the
population with little access to credit. This phenomenon was
known as redlining.93 The large and relatively inexperienced
group of minority potential borrowers was aggressively
pursued by subprime mortgage originators. The extent and
egregiousness of predatory practices targeted at members of
minority communities, regardless of income or other credit risk
factors, strongly suggests that subprime mortgage loans were
foisted upon anyone who could be persuaded to take them,
regardless of whether those borrowers were qualified for better
loans.94
Second, as investor demand for MBS grew,
XQGHUZULWLQJ FULWHULD DQG VHFXULWL]HUV· GXH GLOLJHQFH HIIRUWV

payments for at least several months, which increases the likelihood that the
borrower will not default before the loan is securitized or before the
H[SLUDWLRQ RI WKH RULJLQDWRU·V REOLJDWLRQ WR UHSXUFKDVH DQ\ GHIDXOWHG
mortgage.
93. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of
Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1309 (1995) (describing the overtly racist borrower
rating criteria used by federal agencies beginning in the 1930s);; Adam
Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in
Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 207 (2005) (describing
WKHRULJLQRIWKHWHUP´UHGOLQLQJµ .
94. See generally CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE
AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS OF HIGHER COST HOME PURCHASE
LENDING (2007), available at http://www.calreinvest.org/system/assets/47.pdf.
)RU GLVFXVVLRQV RI PRUWJDJH UHGOLQLQJ DQG VXESULPH OHQGHUV· UHYHUVH
redlining, see, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul de Sac of Race Preference
Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1302 n.232 (2006);; Brescia, supra note 5,
at 282-83 & n.41;; Ding et al., supra note 15, at 194-95;; Allison De Tal, supra
note 60, at 645 n.100.
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vanished.95 The increasingly common practice of fabricating
ERUURZHUV· ILQDQFLDO UHFRUGV in order to make them appear
capable of repaying expensive mortgage loans was partially
PRRWHG E\ VHFXULWL]HUV· FRQFRFWLRQ RI ´ORZ-µ DQG ´QR-
GRFXPHQWDWLRQµORDQSURGXFWVVXFKDV´VWDWHGLQFRPHµ´VWDWHG
DVVHWVµ´QRLQFRPHµ´QRDVVHWVµDQGDEVXUGFRPELnations such
DV ´QR-income, no-DVVHWVµ RU ´1,1$µ ORDQV ZKLFK QRW RQO\
permitted, but required, mortgage originators to make no
PHQWLRQRIWKHERUURZHU·VLQFRPHRUDVVHWV96 The obvious risk
inherent in purchasing securities backed by such recklessly
originated mortgages was used to justify even more onerous
loan terms, facilitating the extension of credit to nearly anyone
with a pulse who could be convinced to sign the paperwork.
B. Borrowers
For the reasons given above, borrowers could traditionally
rely on their lenders to carefully scrutinize their financial
means and lend on terms that did not threaten their ability to
manage their expenses, even in the long term.97 When the
structure of the mortgage lending industry began to
fundamentally change, leading to unprecedented risk-taking
and deception by mortgage originators, borrowers were slow to
adjust. In large part, that failure was due to the changes
occurring on the back-end of mortgage transactions, which
were invisible to borrowers. The industr\·V LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK
borrowers was entirely limited to originators, and therefore did
not reflect the significant shift in incentives that had taken
95. See Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 11-12. See generally, e.g.,
'HOO·$ULFFLD,JDQ /DHYHQ supra note 19;; Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra
note 3;; Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?
Evidence From Subprime Loans (Dec. 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Social Science Research Network), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137)
(follow
´'RZQORDGµ 3XUQDQDQGDPsupra note 74.
96. Many borrowers had no idea that their mortgage loans had been
underwritten according to such outlandish criteria. In fact, many borrowers
had very stable and easily verified income and provided documentation to
their lenders, only to have those lenders ignore the documents in order to
HLWKHU  PRUHHDVLO\IDOVLI\WKHERUURZHU·VILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQRU  SODFH
the borrower in a low- or no-documentation loan product in order to reap the
higher fees and interest rate, or both.
97. See discussion supra Parts I, III(A).
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place when private label securitization began.
Many scholars have speculated upon the ability of
mortgage brokers and originators to repeatedly dupe borrowers
into accepting harmful mortgage loans. While this question is
beyond the scope of this Article, several factors that surely
contributed to this phenomenon can be easily noted. First, as
explained above, there was a very strong racial component to
predatory lending by aggressive mortgage originators.98
Minorities were primed for such practices due to the traditional
EDQNV· ORQJVWDQGLQJ SUDFWLFH RI UHGOLQLQJ WKRVH FRPPXQLWLHV99
Second, brokers and originators engaged in high pressure sales
tactics³tactics that had been better regulated in other
contexts but had not existed in the mortgage lending industry
until relatively recently³thus enabling them to evade
meaningful oversight.100 Third, a borrower struggling to make
his or her unexpectedly rising mortgage payments was unlikely
to find anyone willing, or arguably able, to work with the
borrower to make his or her mortgage more affordable. The
borrower had no contact with the true owner of the mortgage
loan, and as discussed below, even those owners stood to
benefit from borrower defaults in a manner that traditional
portfolio lenders did not.101
Many unsophisticated and
desperate borrowers, already saddled with bad loans, were
therefore trapped, forced to either sell and move out of their
homes, or to refinance their mortgages and hope for better
deals.
C. Securitizers
For the purpose of this subsection, the various entities
involved in the purchase, pooling and securitization of
mortgage loans, the rating and sale of those securities to
98. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
99. See id.
100. See generally discussion supra Part III(A)(2). These tactics include
repeated vague promises of low payments, changing paperwork at the last
minute in order to conceal the true terms of a loan, rushed closings meant to
deprive the borrower from reading paperwork, convoluted contracts and other
documents, discouragement from retaining counsel or seeking any outside
advice, and promoting the sense of a limited one-time offer to purchase or
VDYHWKHERUURZHU·VKRPHWKDWFRXOGQRWEHPDWFKHGHOVHZKHUH
101. See discussion infra Part III(D).
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investors, and the managing of trusts and loan documents are
treated collectively. These entities all participate in the
process of purchasing loans from originators and packaging
them in a manner that will entice a variety of investors to
purchase securities backed by those loans. The purchasers of
the securities, or the investors, do not acquire legal ownership
of the loans.102 Rather, the loans in a particular pool are
XVXDOO\ RZQHG E\ D WUXVW WKDW LV VHW XS IRU WKH LQYHVWRUV·
EHQHILW DQG ZKRVH SXUSRVH LV WR HQDEOH WKH ERUURZHUV· ORDQ
payments to be passed on to investors according to the terms of
the various securities transactions.103
Therefore, the
securitizers retain ownership of the mortgage loans and sell
only the associated revenue stream.104 Despite this formality,
the risk of borrower default is mostly passed on to investors
because it is they, and generally not the securitizers, who will
suffer losses should borrowers fail to make full payments on
their loans.
Securitizers must take steps to assure investors that the
underlying assets³the loans³are sound and profitable. To
that end, securitizers employ credit ratings agencies to opine
on the risk posed by the various kinds, or tranches, of
securities backed by a particular pool of loans, and usually
SURYLGH ´FUHGLW HQKDQFHPHQWVµ WR JXDUG DJDLQVW SRVVLEOH
borrower defaults up to a certain level.105 The ratings agencies
profit only if the securities are sold, which creates an obvious
and troubling conflict of interest. Securitizers also impose
underwriting criteria on loans they purchase. These criteria
vary in order to appeal to a broad range of investors with
differing tolerances for risk, and they relate to DIR and LTV
requirements, the amount of documentation of income and
DVVHWV WR EH FROOHFWHG IURP WKH ERUURZHU WKH ERUURZHU·V FUHGLW
score, and other factors bearing upon the risk of default. MBS
issuers prepare detailed reports regarding numerous features
of the loans and pools of loans backing the securities they offer
in order to provide investors with information about assets

102. For a description of mortgage securitization, see generally
Unterman, supra note 1.
103. Id. at 56-60.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 60-63.
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underlying each class of securities offered.106 The various
parties to the securitization process also draw up intricate
contracts explaining the role of each entity in the transaction.
Investors are thereby given extensive information about the
likely profitability of the loans in a given pool, though the
LQIRUPDWLRQ·V UHOLDELOLW\ LV FRQVWUDLQHG E\ WKH DFFXUDF\ RI WKH
RULJLQDWRUV· DQG DSSUDLVHUV· UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH
SRRO·V ORDQV DQG SURSHUWLHV  $Q\ REIXVFDWLRQ H[DJJHUDWLRQ RU
PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ QRW GHWHFWHG E\ WKH VHFXULWL]HUV· GXH
diligence efforts may be passed on to investors.
The securitizers profit by successfully issuing securities to
investors. Pointing out risky features of the mortgage loans
backing the securities, however, obviously reduces profits.
Similarly, reducing the number of loans available to back
securities, which in turn reduces the number of securities that
FDQ EH LVVXHG UHGXFHV VHFXULWL]HUV· SURILWV  6HFXULWL]HUV
therefore have an incentive to encourage originators to make as
many loans as possible and to make those loans appear as
sound as possible.107
The refinancing of subprime mortgages into new and
bigger subprime mortgages had a multiplier effect that was
just as profitable for securitizers as it was for originators, since
securitizers also depended on volume to generate profits. A
high rate of relatively quick refinancing had the potential of
driving away securities investors who might otherwise have
deemed the securities to be unprofitable, given the relatively
small total payments made on loans still in their early years.
Securitizers, however, offered many classes of securities in
relation to each pool of mortgage loans. Thus, an investor
could essentially bet on the likelihood of an early payoff.108
Furthermore, much of the costs of early payoffs were passed on
106. Such a report, often included in such filings from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission as prospectuses (or prospectus
supplements, or free-writing prospectuses), can easily run to 1,000 pages.
For a thorough discussion of the information exchange between securities
issuers and investors, see generally Gerding, supra note 4.
107. Again, the cash-out feature of refinance loans is crucial to making a
loan affordable for a long enough period of time to allow the sale of securities
without any sign of unaffordability. See supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
108. For example, purchasers of classes of securities backed by interest
payments stood to lose from early payoffs, while purchasers of classes of
securities backed by principal payments, stood to gain from early payoffs.
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to borrowers in the form of prepayment penalties (which were
themselves securitized).109 In addition to providing investors
with a choice regarding exposure to the risk of prepayment,
subprime mortgage loans were, as discussed above, precisely
tuned to maximize the predictability of default, and thus payoff
(often through refinance),110 which enabled investors to assess
the likely number and timing of refinances in the pool.
Notably, there was little need to forecast the performance of a
subprime mortgage loan deep into its thirty-year term because
the borrower was expected to fully repay the loan, either
through refinance or sale, long before then. The convoluted
structure of subprime mortgage loans thus facilitated not only
originator misrepresentations to borrowers, but also the
minimization of uncertainty about loan performance for MBS
purchasers, and thus the marketing of those securities to a
broad group of investors.
D. Investors
The massive explosion of the MBS market, and thus the
mortgage lending market itself, was partly fueled by the short-
term and repeated refinancing of subprime mortgage loans that
were not sustainable over their full terms. Loans were
essentially repaid with home equity rather than with borrower
This process was so carefully and tightly
income.111
109. A prepayment penalty is a fee imposed on a borrower who pays
more than a certain amount³for example, twenty percent of the outstanding
balance³during a certain period, usually the first year, two years, or three
years after origination of the loan. See also discussion supra Part III(B).
110. See discussion supra Part III(A).
The time of default (i.e.,
refinance) could not be perfectly predicted because ARMs were based on
indices whose future fluctuations could not be known in advance. All other
things being equal, reductions in an index (and thus in mortgage interest
rates) would lead to a greater number of refinances (since cheaper mortgages
would be available), and vice versa.
111. $ODUJHSRUWLRQRIDVXESULPHPRUWJDJHORDQ·VSD\PHQWVZHUHPDGH
RXW RI WKH SURSHUW\·V HTXLW\³loans that did not fully amortize did not pay
particularly well while they were in repayment, but led to large payoffs when
they were refinanced. It was the next loan that made the prior loan
OXFUDWLYH QRW MXVW WKH ERUURZHU·V SD\PHQWV  7KH VDPHLV WUXH RI PRUWJDJHV
with large interest rate increases³even though the borrower may not make
many of the payments due after the increase, those payments will have to be
made when the next mortgage pays off the current one. Similarly, equity was
often liquidated by a refinance loan in the form of cash and then used to
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manipulated by the entities that created and sold the securities
that it was massively profitable for these entities and their
investor clients. But the perpetuation of that profitability
depended upon two crucial conditions: that residential property
values increase rapidly and perpetually. Property values
needed to increase rapidly enough to sustain the periodic
refinances which, because they were loaded with fees, costs,
and consolidation of all imaginable kinds of other debts, were
often significantly larger in amount than their predecessor
loans. The methodical and unrelenting cycle of subprime loan
flipping likely contributed substantially to the rise in property
values, especially once those values reached levels that
virtually no one, without exceptionally high income, could
possibly afford to sustain over the full course of any reasonable
thirty-year mortgage.
As for the other condition upon which the MBS market
depended, it is now obvious that property values could not
continue their vertiginous climb in perpetuity. But because
each subsequent round of subprime loans was larger in market
value and less viable than the previous loans, the need for
rising property values became increasingly acute and the
potential consequences of price stagnation or depreciation
became increasingly dire. This was a classical pyramid scheme
situation: (1) each new round of investors paid off the previous
round of investors;; (2) each new round of investment, because
it paid off prior investments, was larger than the previous one;;
(3) finding enough new investments to sustain the cycle became
increasingly difficult, leading to the erosion of underwriting
standards in making new mortgage loans;; and (4) ultimately,
the entire market crashed when it was revealed that the value
of assets backing the investments was grossly insufficient to
justify the prices of the securities. One notable difference
between this pyramid scheme and others is that the MBS
investors had ample information about what they were
purchasing.112 Arguably, they understood, or should have
understood, that they were investing in an unsustainable asset
bubble. Therefore, they were simply betting that they would be
DEOHWRJHWRXWEHIRUHWKHPDUNHW·VFROODSVH
make payments on the subsequent loan. See generally discussion supra Part
III(A)(2).
112. See discussion supra Part III(D).
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E. The Collapse
As the subprime MBS market grew, the individual
subprime mortgage loans became increasingly difficult for
borrowers to repay and the rate and rapidity of borrower
defaults increased.113 Perhaps for this reason or perhaps for
entirely unrelated reasons, investors decided to pull out. The
vast majority of MBS were rated extremely safe, and even a
minimal increase in defaults may have persuaded cautious
institutional investors to abstain. Whatever the reason for
LQYHVWRUV· GHSDUWXUH IURP WKH 0%6PDUNHW VHFXUitizers either
did not notice their absence or they merely assumed that it was
due to a temporary decline in the market. Many of the largest
securitizers, therefore, continued to purchase and pool
subprime mortgage loans for a long time after they began
having difficulty selling their securities.
By the time
securitizers realized that they had missed the contraction, they
already had significant backlogs of mortgage loans that they
could not securitize. This caused them to suddenly cease or
cancel subprime loan purchases, leading to a quick succession
of originator failures and bankruptcies.114 At this point, many
borrowers were stuck with mortgage loans that they could
neither afford nor refinance. In addition, borrowers could not
escape their mortgages by selling their properties because
purchasers could no longer obtain financing. The result was a
massive real estate depreciation that left homeowners in
default on their mortgage loans with outstanding balances far
LQ H[FHVV RI WKHLU KRPHV· QHZ YDOXHV The prospects for MBS
owners³which at this point included all of the securitizers who
had been caught with unmarketable mortgages³to recover
anything approaching the face value of their securities were
113. See, e.g., Purnanandam, supra note 74, at 8-13 (discussing the four-
fold increase in mortgage charge-offs from the first through the fourth
quarters of 2007);; Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at 7-9. In addition, Demyanyk
DQG9DQ+HPHUWDVVHUWWKDW´VHFXULWL]HUVZHUHWRVRPHH[WHQWDZDUHRIµWKe
progressively deteriorating quality of mortgage loans over a period of six
years leading to the current crisis. Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 3,
at 5.
114. See Kiff & Mills, supra note 3, at  QRWLQJWKDWILUPV´UHSUHVHQWLQJ
about 40 percent of 2006 subprime originations, have either closed down
RSHUDWLRQVGHFODUHGEDQNUXSWF\RUEHHQEDLOHGRUERXJKWRXWµ 
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dim and in decline.
IV. Solutions
The incentives created by the private-label subprime
mortgage securitization market led its various participants to
engage in, abet, or simply turn a blind eye to, a wide range of
grossly abusive practices by mortgage originators. Altering the
incentives of any of the participants in a manner that would
make such conduct unfeasible could prevent such a massive
buildup of highly overvalued assets from accumulating in the
IXWXUH  (IIRUWV KDG ORQJ EHHQ PDGH WR LPSURYH ERUURZHUV·
bargaining positions by requiring lenders to make extensive
disclosures regarding the loans they offered.115 This had no
appreciable effect for the following reasons: (1) the high
pressure tactics employed by predatory lenders included
rushing borrowers through closings in order to deprive them of
a meaningful opportunity to read the disclosure documents;; (2)
additional disclosures merely added to the large volume of
paperwork present at mortgage closings, making it harder for
borrowers to pick out the few truly important documents;; and
(3) subprime loan terms had become so convoluted that most
borrowers would not have understood them even if given the
opportunity to carefully and repeatedly scrutinize them.
$WWHPSWV WR UHIRUP RULJLQDWRUV· FRUUXSW LQFHQWLYHV KDYH
also been made, namely through the passage of the very same
consumer protection laws meant to inform borrowers.116 Many
115. At the federal level, these efforts are primarily embodied by the
Truth in Lending Act of 1968 ´7,/$µ 3XE/1R-321 § 102, 82 Stat. 146
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)), HOEPA § 151, and the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533 § 2, 88 Stat.
1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006)). Many states have also
enacted various disclosure laws similar to, and in some instances more
comprehensive than, the federal statutes. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1²
13 (2009);; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-127 (West 2008);; MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 12-311 (West 2002);; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-409.1 (West
2008);; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-1029 (West 2002);; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 183C, § 1-19 (West 2006);; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-21A-1²14 (West
2008);; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l (McKinney 2008);; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-23-10²
85 (2009).
116. Many of these laws simply imposed the ineffective disclosure
requirements, established in the consumer protection statutes such as those
cited in supra note 115.
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of the predatory origination tactics discussed above violate
federal and state laws and can lead to monetary damages and
even invalidation of the debt.117 However, these laws only
impose liability on originators who,118 because they tend to be
thinly capitalized fly-by-night operations and because they are
often sued by numerous victims, are rarely able to make
aggrieved borrowers whole and often cease to exist entirely by
the time that borrower discovers the wrongdoing and seeks
legal assistance.119 Indeed, the ephemeral nature of many
subprime mortgage originators makes them poor targets of
direct policy influence. Rather, these companies are the most
responsive to the incentives created by their financiers³the
securitizers and, indirectly, the securities investors.
Most jurisdictions hold assignees liable for the acts of their
assignors, up to the amount of the debt.120 However, that
general rule has been gutted by the holder in due course
´+,'&µ  GRFWULQH HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH 8QLIRUP &RPPHUFLDO
&RGH ´8&&µ 121 That doctrine provides that purchasers of
negotiable instruments who take ownership according to
certain minimal criteria are only liable for a very limited

117. These laws, including common law fraud, unfair and deceptive
practices statutes, TILA, and civil rights statutes, are inadequate in a
number of ways, but that subject is beyond the scope of this Article.
118. There are a few very narrow provisions for assignee liability in
some statutes, but they have proved to be insignificant. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
1641(d) (2006);; N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-306 (McKinney 2001) (providing that an
DVVLJQHHZKRLVQRWD´KROGHULQGXHFRXUVHµRIDQHJRWLDEOHLQVWUXPHQW³and
where mortgage loan notes are usually deemed negotiable instruments³is
VXEMHFWWRPRVWGHIHQVHVWRWKHLQVWUXPHQW·VHQIRUFHPHQW 
119. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 2273 (describing undercapitalized
RULJLQDWRUV DV ´GLVSRVDEOH ILOWHU>V@ DEVRUELQJ DQG GHIOHFWLQJ RULJLQDWLRQ
claims and defenses until those claims and defenses render the business
VWUXFWXUHXQXVDEOHµ 
120. See, e.g., Vig v. Ni[3URMHFW,,3·VKLS3G $UL]&W$SS
  ´An assignee steps into the shoes of her assignor. She can stand in no
better position than the assignor and [a]n assignment cannot alter the
GHIHQVHV RU HTXLWLHV RI WKH WKLUG SDUW\·µ  LQWHUQDO quotation marks and
citation omitted);; Mid-Am. Appliance Corp. v. Federated Fin. Co., 109 N.W.2d
381,  1HE   ´An assignee generally acquires no greater right than
that possessed by the assignor. The assignee stands in the shoes of the
assignor and is bound by the terms of the contract to the same extent as the
DVVLJQRUµ  LQWHUQDO FLWDWLRQV RPLWWHG  ,QW·O 5LEERQ 0LOOV /WG Y $UMDQ
5LEERQV,QF1(G 1<  ´,WLVHOHPHQWDU\DQFLHQWODZ
that an assignee never stands in aQ\EHWWHUSRVLWLRQWKDQKLVDVVLJQRUµ 
121. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2004).
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number of defenses against enforcement.122 These defenses
generally do not include any of the consumer protection claims
arising from predatory lending that borrowers have against
originators. As a result of the judgment-proof nature of
VXESULPH RULJLQDWRUV· EXVLQHVVHV DQG Whe liability laundering
effect of the sale of mortgage loans into the secondary market,
flagrantly illegal lending practices were permitted to go
unremedied. Securitizers and investors operated in a veritable
regulatory and legal black hole.
The resulting lack of
accountability permitted originators, securitizers, and
investors to act recklessly and then shift the costs of their
recklessness entirely onto the borrowers whose promises to
pay, whether unwitting or careless, were at the core of the
MBS market.
Shifting that cost back onto the lenders, by making the
current owners of mortgage loans liable to borrowers, would
have two principal and salutary effects. First, it would
counteract the otherwise unchecked incentive to make
unsustainable loans by discouraging fraud and other illegal
practices. This would be accomplished by enlisting securitizers
and investors in the effort to curb origination fraud. If these
SDUWLHV ERUH WKH FRVWV RI RULJLQDWRUV· LOOHJDO SUDFWLFHV WKH\
would be far more likely to sFUXWLQL]HRULJLQDWRUV·FRQGXFWDQG
to demand that originators comply with the law. Second,
securitizers would have an incentive to purchase loans from
well-capitalized originators with sustainable business
practices. Such originators are far more likely to remain in
business for a long time and thus to be available to indemnify
securitziers and investors who are eventually held liable to
borrowers. This would reverse the current incentive to do
business with transient originators whose disappearances
deprive borrowers of redress and thus discourage borrowers
from challenging the validity of their loans.
Far from being novel, such wholesale assignee liability
already exists, and is in fact mandatory, in a number of other
industries. High-pressure deceptive practices of the kinds
mentioned in this article have long been widespread, especially
122. See id. One requirement is that the assignment be taken in good
faith, which arguably is often not the case. Delving into this inquiry,
however, is expensive, and evidence of bad faith by entities whose dealings
are largely closed to scrutiny is difficult to unearth.
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in the very same minority communities in which predatory
mortgage lending has been rampant.123 It was once common
for salesmen of consumer goods, automobiles, insurance, and
numerous other products to unlawfully induce customers into
financing purchases of their merchandise on unfavorable
terms.124 These debts were then sold onto the secondary
PDUNHW DQG ZHUH WKXV ODXQGHUHG RI FRQVXPHUV· SURWHFWLRQV
against enforcement by the holder in due course doctrine.125
7KH )HGHUDO 7UDGH &RPPLVVLRQ ´)7&µ  GHFLVLYHO\ FXUEHG WKLV
problem by issuing its Holder Notice rule in 1975.126 This rule
required all financing contracts in certain affected industries to
contain language defeating the negotiability of the debt
instrument, thereby effectively abrogating the holder in due
course status of any subsequent purchaser.127 It is only a
historical accident that resulted in the omission of mortgage
lending from the list of protected industries;; private label
mortgage securitization was not yet significant and thus
predatory mortgage lending practices were not yet rampant. It
ZRXOGVLPSO\WDNHWKHH[WHQVLRQRIWKH)7&·VKROGHUQRWLFHUXOH
to the mortgage lending industry to realign lender incentives
and return some measure of responsibility and prudence to
that market.128
123. See, e.g., Heastie v. Cmty. Bank of Greater Peoria, 727 F. Supp.
1133, 1135-36 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing abuses prompting the adoption of
the holder notice rule);; David A. Szwak, The )7& ´+ROGHUµ 5XOH, 60
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 361, 361-62 (2006);; Julia Patterson Forrester,
Constructing a New Theoretical Framework For Home Improvement
Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1105-07 (1996) (discussing fraudulent
practices and the effect of the holder notice rule in the home improvement
industry).
124. See, e.g., Szwak, supra note 123.
125. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 1912 (  QRWLQJ WKDW ´>W@KH
F.T.C. rule has not significantly restricted the flow of consumer credit and or
LQWHUIHUHGZLWKWKHVHFXULWL]DWLRQRIDXWRORDQVµ 
126. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2006).
127. Id.
128. It bears noting that Peterson does not consider the extension of the
Holder Notice rule to mortgage loans, or the extension of assignee liability
generally, as a sufficient remedy to the problems discussed in this Article.
+HDUJXHVWKDWWKHH[WHQVLRQ´ZRXOGQRWEULQJWKHODZXSWRGDWHµDQGWKDWLW
ZRXOGPHUHO\FRQVWLWXWH´DWUDQVLWLRQIURPEODPLQJWKHYLFWLPWREODPLQJWKH
patV\µ QDPHO\ WKH LQYHVWRU  DQG WKXV ZRXOG LQ VRPH VHQVH ´JR WRR IDU E\
forcing relatively innocent investors to bear the brunt of large punitive
GDPDJHDZDUGVµ3HWHUVRQsupra note 8, at 2275. Strangely, Peterson favors
the extension of shared liability doctrines such as common law conspiracy,
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V. Conclusion
Numerous mistakes were made during the MBS market
boom, which all combined to amplify the resulting damage.
Other authors have identified steps that investors could have
taken in order to limit their exposure to overvalued
securities.129 But few have addressed the structural features of
the mortgage and securities markets that encouraged the
overvaluation of subprime mortgage loans in the first place.
One such feature was the elimination of the bankruptcy tax
resulting from depositing loans into bankruptcy-remote SPVs.
Unfortunately, few plausible solutions have been offered to
negate the distortion of securitizer and investor incentives
caused by this feature. At any rate, the elimination of the
bankruptcy tax is not the only significant distortion that must
be addressed in order to restore prudence and sustainability to
mortgage lending. Another such distortion is the reduction, to
near elimination, of legal liability for fraudulent and other
abusive lending practices.
There are compelling reasons to effectively prevent
predatory lending practices by subprime mortgage loan
originators that are unrelated to the proper functioning of
financial markets. Those practices have devastated large
communities and brought thousands of families to financial
ruin.
But even leaving those concerns aside, predatory
mortgage lending has caused unacceptable damage and loss,
which warrants strict regulation and enforcement.
The
changes in the fundamental organization and operation of the
aider-abettor, and joint venture theories, over consumer protection statutes.
Id. at 2275-79. It is difficult to see how this approach differs from the
currently inadequate doctrines which shift the burden onto borrowers to
SURYH DVVLJQHHV· EDG IDLWK RU FRPSOLFLW\ EHIRUH DOORZLQJ WKHP DQ\ UHFRYHU\
from those assignees. Ultimately, it is a disagreement about how to most
effectively influence the behavior of securitizers. Peterson argues for joint or
imputed liabLOLW\ IRU WKRVH DFWV XQGHUWDNHQ LQ IXUWKHUDQFH RI RULJLQDWRUV·
illegal behavior, which places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. I, however,
DUJXH WKDW KROGLQJ LQYHVWRUV OLDEOH IRU RULJLQDWRUV· LOOHJDO EHKDYLRU ZLOO
inherently prevent securitizers from encouraging such illegality because
investors will refuse to invest in such enterprises, without the substantial
impediments for the borrower-SODLQWLII WKDW 3HWHUVRQ·V SUHIHUUHG PRGHO
imposes.
129. See supra notes 1-8.
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mortgage lending market led to equally significant changes in
OHQGHUV· LQFHQWLYHV DQG EHKDYLRU  'HFHLWIXO PDUNHWLQJ ZHQW
from being bad business to being the engine that drove the
massive growth of the subprime MBS boom. But it also
ensured that the growth was predicated upon unsustainable
long-term promises by borrowers and unrealistic expectations
of perpetually increasing property values. The result was a
pyramid scheme that ensnared millions of institutional
investors worldwide who placed hundreds of billions of dollars
at stake. The inevitable collapse of this illusory market has
been catastrophic, with consequences likely to last years and
cost trillions of dollars.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/14

38

